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Abstract
Recent research has documented a positive relationship between real exchange rate
(RER) levels and economic growth. The literature has interpreted this correlation as
causality running from RER levels to growth rates; i.e., higher, undervalued, more com-
petitive RERs tend to favor growth. Little effort has been made, however, on the analysis
of the policy instruments required to implement a successful competitive RER strategy.
An exchange rate policy targeting a permanent change in the RER may run into difficul-
ties: it is well documented that nominal and real exchange rate movements are correlated
almost one for one in the short run but such co-movement slowly vanishes in the long
run. Targeting instead a transitory RER undervaluation can have long-lasting effects on
economic performance if RER competitiveness is stable and durable enough to provide in-
centives for tradable activities to expand. The ability to provide such an environment may
be beyond the scope of exchange rate policy. This paper aims to shed light on the com-
plementary policies that facilitate the success of an exchange rate policy that temporarily
increases competitiveness. A formal model inspired by Ros and Skott (1998) is developed
to analyze these issues. The main conclusion is that an exchange rate depreciation would
more likely trigger an acceleration of growth if it is simultaneously implemented with do-
mestic demand management policies that prevent non-tradables price inflation and wage
management policies that coordinate wage increases with tradable productivity growth.
∗Contact Author: Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003; email:
mrapetti@econs.umass.edu
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1 Introduction
A competitive real exchange rate (RER) provides an environment conducive to economic
growth. This has become a popular view among development economists and practitioners
supported by a body of recent research which has documented a robust positive relationship
between RER levels and economic growth, especially in developing countries.1 The literature
has interpreted this correlation as causality running from RER levels to economic growth -i.e.,
higher, undervalued, more competitive RERs tend to favor growth- but has shed little light
on the mechanisms involved in such a causality.2 Two main channels have been proposed.
First, it has been indicated that competitive RERs may stimulate capital accumulation by
relaxing foreign exchange (FX) constraints in countries in which capital goods are mainly
imported.3 In developing countries with substantial open or hidden unemployment, the ar-
gument goes, growth can be accelerated with policies that mobilize unemployed resources.
However, the acceleration of growth and capital accumulation have an impact on the bal-
ance of payments, especially if the dependence on imported capital goods is high. In such
conditions, a competitive RER would help relax foreign exchange bottlenecks that otherwise
could restrain the development process. This argument highlights the notion that develop-
ing countries are capital goods importers and that current account deficits tend to adjust
mostly through slower growth (i.e., quantities) than via endogenous RER depreciation (i.e.,
prices). A second explanation suggests that competitive RERs enhance growth by fostering
productivity growth in the tradable sector. Following a long tradition in the dual economy
and export-led growth literature, this view sees tradable sector as mostly comprised by “mod-
ern” manufactures and therefore “special” in the sense that it is the locus where increasing
returns to scale in the form of technological spillovers and learning by doing externalities are
more prevalent.4 Importantly, both channels share the notion that the relationship between
RER undervaluation and economic growth is intermediated by the expansion of the tradable
sector. In the first channel, the expansion of tradable activities increases the production of
exportables and import substitutes, augmenting the capacity to import capital goods and
thus accelerating capital accumulation and economic growth. In the second, the expansion of
the tradable sector accelerates growth due to the exploitation of increasing returns. Research
has not yielded a clear answer regarding the relative importance of each channel, but both
channels underscore that development and structural change are tradable-led.
If a competitive RER promotes development by helping tradable sector expand then an im-
portant question regards the policies that deliver such a relative price configuration. Exchange
rate policy is a priori a natural candidate. A casual inspection at central banks’ behavior in
developing countries shows that they actively intervene in the FX market. This occurs not
only in countries that adopt fixed or semi-fixed exchange rate regimes but also in those that
formally implement floating regimes (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). Moreover, in many cases
1See, among others, Razin and Collins (1999), Hausmann et al. (2005), Aguirre and Calderon (2005), Prasad
et al. (2007), Gala (2008), Rodrik (2008) and Rapetti et al. (2011).
2I follow the definition of nominal exchange rate as the domestic price of a foreign currency. Consequently,
a higher RER implies a more competitive, depreciated or undervalued domestic currency in real terms.
3See Porcile and Lima (2009) and Razmi et al. (2011).
4See Rodrik (2008 and 2010) and Korinek and Serven (2010).
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floating cum FX intervention policies have actively been oriented to prevent RER appreciation
or to preserve undervalued RER levels (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2009). Thus, exchange
rate policy can be and is used to target competitive RERs. However, it is also known that
its efficacy evaporates over time. It is well documented in the empirical literature on RER
behavior that nominal and real exchange rate movements are correlated almost one for one
in the short run, but such correlation gradually vanishes over time (Taylor and Taylor, 2004).
Even if exchange rate policy cannot induce permanent changes in the RER, it can still be
useful. The idea that short and medium-run nominal shocks can have permanent effects on
economic performance is well-established in macroeconomics. Consequently, exchange rate
policy having a temporary effect on the level of the RER may have long-lasting effects on the
economy. In fact, this argument has already been formalized. For instance, inspired in the
British experience with Mrs. Thatcher’s tight monetary policy during the early 1980s, Krug-
man (1987) developed a trade model showing how a transitory RER overvaluation can lead to
a permanent contraction of the tradable sector. Similarly, Ros and Skott (1998) built a dual
economy model to characterize the experiences of de-industrialization in Latin America dur-
ing the 1990s after the implementation of trade liberalization and RER overvaluation policies.
A key element in both models is the existence of dynamic increasing returns in the tradable
sector due to learning by doing. Given this assumption, a transitory RER overvaluation can
erode tradable profitability permanently if during the transitory period those tradable firms
displaced by foreign competition worsen their ability at manufacturing goods significantly.
Once the RER reverts to its long-run equilibrium level, these firms will have experienced a
substantial productivity loss which makes them unable to compete internationally. The re-
sult is a permanent contraction of the tradable sector. These models focused on the case of
overvaluation, but the mechanism can easily be reversed to the opposite case: a transitory
RER undervaluation that leads to a substantial increase in tradable productivity, turns the
sector profitable at the equilibrium RER level and thus stimulates its expansion.
The fact that a transitory RER undervaluation can expand tradable production and accelerate
economic growth, however, does not imply that exchange rate policy is all that is required in a
competitive RER strategy. The essence of such a strategy is to increase tradable profitability
and thus provide incentives for the expansion of this sector. Thus, a RER undervaluation -
although transitory- needs to be stable and durable enough to provide such incentives. Several
factors influence tradable profitability, but a very important one is the set of relative prices
between tradable goods and the inputs for their production; i.e., non-tradable goods and labor.
The ability to provide a constellation of relative prices that stimulates tradable production
may be beyond the scope of exchange rate policy. While this policy has a tight control over the
absolute price of tradables, it does not directly determine their price relative to non-tradables
and labor. To simultaneously influence the determination of non-tradable prices and wages
other policies targeting these prices might be needed. As a result, a development strategy that
intends to stimulate tradable production by generating relative price incentives may require
a coordination of several policies; in particular, exchange rate policy targeting the price of
tradables, domestic demand management policies influencing the evolution of non-tradable
prices and wage management policies affecting the behavior of wages.
The aim of this paper is to analyze how such policies need to be coordinated. The paper
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falls in five sections. After this introduction, the next section describes the essence of the
argument. Section 3 turns these ideas into a formal model. The framework makes the case
that exchange policy itself may not be enough to induce economic development and structural
change. Section 4 explores how the use of complementary policies might help exchange rate
policy to achieve that goal. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Motivation
The main goal of a competitive RER strategy for development is to promote the expansion of
the tradable sector via price incentives. The incentives may not be permanent but the bet is
that tradable firms will accumulate capital, technology and knowledge, which would turn them
productive enough to face international competition and to sustain the accumulation process
once the price incentive has disappeared. Thus, when a government carries a competitive
RER strategy, it is running a race against time: tradable productivity has to grow enough
before the transitory price incentive vanishes.
Governments may intervene in two fronts. One is to implement policies that complement
and strengthen the incentives generated by the RER undervaluation. These includes sectoral
policies such as subsidized credits, tax exceptions, direct subsidies, infrastructure building
and other conventional industrial and trade policies. The other alternative is to conduct
policies aiming to preserve the RER undervaluation incentive as much as possible. This
would imply the coordination of exchange rate policy with fiscal, monetary and incomes
policies in an attempt to moderate the rise of non-tradable prices and wages, which are key
costs of production affecting tradable profitability. The first set of policies played a significant
role in most successful development experiences (Rodrik, 1995). However, since the 1980s
they gradually lost mainstream appeal as the critics pointed to information problems, rent-
seeking and government failures. Their use has also been threatened by WTO regulations.
Policies targeting the RER appear to be more market-friendly and are rarely penalized -at
least in current conditions- by international trade and financial agreements. Although recent
successful experiences of development appear to have relied on both strategies, targeting the
RER seems to be more popular in present times. Without implying any judgment, the paper
focuses on them and does not discuss the role of trade and industrial policies.
A devaluation targeting a competitive RER raises tradable sector profitability but also switches
the demand for non-tradable goods against tradable goods. In a small open developing econ-
omy, with substantial unemployment and underemployment, tradable production will expand
due to the undervaluation incentive, and non-tradable output will also increase due to the rise
of demand generated by the positive income and substitution effects. Thus, an exchange rate
policy targeting a competitive RER is likely to have a positive impact on economic activity
in the short run.5
In the medium run, if investment is sensitive to profitability, the competitive RER generates
5A devaluation can certainly have contractionary effects in the short-run (Frankel, 2005). In the case they
exist, once digested, the expansive effects described above are assumed to prevail.
4
incentives for capital accumulation in the tradable sector and accelerates economic growth.6
The sustainability of this process depends on how the constellation of relative prices affecting
tradable profitability evolves as the economy grows. To think about this, it is convenient to
assume that the government performs a one-time devaluation to achieve a competitive RER
and then keeps the nominal exchange rate fixed. In such scenario, if the economy is open to
trade, it is not unreasonable to assume that tradable prices would remain relatively stable
over time according to the law of price.7 All the action would then rest on the evolution of
non-tradable prices and nominal wages.
Non-tradable prices are determined by domestic market conditions. Since the analysis focuses
on a medium run process, it may be reasonable to think of a situation in which productivity
growth in the non-tradable sector is negligible, making supply conditions depend exclusively
on the availability of labor, a key input of production.8 In a developing economy, it seems
reasonable to assume that the supply of non-tradable goods is quite elastic at the beginning
of the development process due to the existence of substantial unemployment and underem-
ployment. The degree of elasticity would critically depend on how scarce labor is. It is likely
to observe a substantially more elastic supply of non-tradables in a low income country (e.g.
China) than in a middle income country (e.g. Argentina).
Demand for non-tradables, on the other hand, depends on income and the relative price
between tradables and non-tradables. If a competitive RER accelerates economic growth,
the demand for non-tradables would also grow fast. Besides this income effect, it would be
additionally stimulated by the substitution effect caused by the change in relative prices. It is
important to notice that the pace of its growth could be influenced by the government, because
it mostly spends on non-tradable goods and also can affect private demand via different
policies.
Given these expected behaviors of demand and supply, as the economy grows there would be a
tendency towards non-tradable price increases; i.e., towards RER appreciation.9 The precise
pace that this tendency towards RER appreciation takes would depend on the elasticity of
supply and the way the government influences the evolution of the demand for non-tradables.
In countries where surplus labor is less abundant and price adjustments are more prevalent,
6Investment is mostly dominated by expected profitability, although actual profitability may also play a
relevant role when firms face credit constraints. Expectations about the future are thus crucial for investment
decisions. The view I adopt about the way agents form expectations is rather “behavioralist”. Future is by its
own nature unknown. On the other hand, agents face costs at gathering information and have limited cognitive
abilities to process the information at their dispose. In such a context, past and present conditions could be
reasonable guides to form expectations about the future. Thus, if the undervaluation incentive has been stable
and lasted long enough, it would likely induce tradable firms to invest.
7Although empirical literature has systematically documented the violation of this “law” for non-commodity
tradable goods (Goldberg and Knetter, 1997), the assumption still seems reasonable as a stylized first approx-
imation.
8Certainly, labor is not the only input influencing supply conditions of non-tradables. Infrastructure, energy
and land may be other relevant factors. For simplicity, I will ignore the possibility that these factors may
constrain the supply of non-tradables.
9Given the assumptions that non-tradable productivity is constant and tradable productivity is (presum-
ably) catching up due to the accumulation of capital, technology and knowledge, this tendency towards RER
appreciation resembles the Balassa-Samuelson effect.
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government policy may be crucial. If the government uses its instruments to further stimulate
the demand for non-tradable goods, prices would tend to rise faster and the undervaluation
incentive would tend to evaporate rapidly. On the contrary, if it uses its instruments to lower
down the growth of demand for non-tradables, it may soften the appreciation trend.
Domestic demand management policies -which include monetary, fiscal and incomes policies-
can be used to manage the pace of the demand for non-tradables. Given that under a com-
petitive RER strategy exchange rate policy is actively used to target the price of tradables, a
question arises regarding how effective monetary policy can be. The well-known open economy
trilemma posits that in conditions of capital mobility, monetary and exchange rate policies
cannot be instrumented simultaneously. Real world experience shows, however, that because
financial assets are not perfect substitutes -a key assumption leading to the prediction of the
trilemma- sterilized FX market interventions provide some leeway for a simultaneous use of
these policies. Capital account management techniques can also be useful to gain some control
over both.10 In any case, even when these instruments are implemented, it seems clear that
in a competitive RER regime since monetary policy is subordinated to exchange rate policy,
the ability to simultaneously use it with domestic demand goals is reduced. The implication
is that fiscal policy has a greater responsibility at managing the pace of domestic demand
than in standard inflation targeting regimes, in which domestic demand management relies
almost exclusively on monetary policy.11
The evolution of wages is affected by the conditions in the labor market. It seems natural to
think that employment expands without much upward pressures on wages in countries where
the elasticity of labor supply is high; the extreme case being one with constant real wages in
an economy with unlimited supply of labor as in Lewis (1954). By contrast, more pronounced
wage increases occur in countries where surplus labor is less abundant. To rationalize wage
behavior as being determined exclusively by market conditions would be misleading. Wage
determination is also affected by institutional, political, cultural/moral factors. These factors
are in their very nature context-dependent, which leaves wages determination, as Rees (1993)
says, within “a zone of indeterminacy” (p. 244). In this sense, the theory of wage deter-
mination is a very historical subject. These “historical factors” can be influenced by public
intervention. Government have direct influence over labor market regulations and therefore
over wage determination. They can affect wage determination indirectly by influencing wage-
norms or establishing the rules for wage bargaining between workers and firms. They also
set public wages which are in many cases a point of reference for the determination of pri-
vate sector wages. Thus, the level and evolution of wages are to some extent influenced by
governments through these direct and indirect instruments, which can be labeled as wage
10See, for instance, Frenkel and Rapetti (2010) who describe the experiences of Argentina during the 2000s
and Chile between mid-1980s and mid-1990s in which monetary and exchange rate policies were simultaneously
implemented under competitive RER regimes. See Frenkel (2007) for an analysis of the conditions under which
sterilized FX interventions are sustainable. See, Ocampo (2003) on the effectiveness of capital controls in
developing countries.
11With some ingenuity, governments could also use other instruments to target the pace of non-tradable goods
demand more directly. For instance, taxes, subsides and credit lines may be used to influence the composition
of aggregate expenditure; in particular, the demand for tradables relative to non-tradables. However, real
world experience reveals that these instruments play a secondary role at best.
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management policies.
Figure 1 may help illustrate the argument developed so far. It portraits three stylized dy-
namics of the RER undervaluation incentive in a developing economy. This is captured as
the distance between labor productivity (Y/L) and the product wage in the tradable sec-
tor (W/PT ), which are key determinants of tradable profitability.
12 Following the discussion
above, tradable production may operate with increasing returns to scale in a broad sense.
Before the nominal devaluation at time t, tradable productivity and real wages are stagnant.
The devaluation reduces the product wage due to the increase in the tradable price. A key
issue is whether this increase in tradable profitability is stable and durable enough to trigger
a sustained expansion in the tradable sector. In countries with high elasticity of labor supply,
the increased tradable profitability would tend to persist: output and employment growth in
this sector would not generate major increases in its costs of production. An extreme case is
represented by the red line which remains flat during the transition period. The profitability
incentive -i.e., the distance between the red line W/PT and the thick solid black line Y/L-
increases in time due to the productivity gains arising from the increasing returns. Eventually,
wages would tend to rise as the supply of labor becomes “limited”, but this would happen
beyond the medium-run frame of this analysis (thus not shown in the figure).
Figure 1: Three stylized dynamics
Such a scenario is less likely for developing countries with lower labor supply elasticities.
The initial expansion of tradable sector would gradually generate upward pressures on non-
tradable prices and wages, which would tend to erode the relative price incentive. As usual,
the devil is in the details: different results can arise depending on how gradual this process
is. Put differently, different results will emerge depending on the “race” between tradable
productivity growth and the increase in unit costs. If the undervaluation incentive erodes
relatively rapidly, investment in the tradable sector would not prosper and the virtuous effect
12For simplicity I use the product wage as a proxy of unit costs, which would also include non-tradable
goods. Since the determination of nominal wages are arguably influenced by the evolution of non-tradable
prices, as modeled in the next section, this relative price captures the set of relative prices that are relevant to
determine tradable sector profitability.
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of accumulation in the tradable sector would not operate. This case is represented by the
gray solid lines in figure 1. The contraction of the product wage after the devaluation is
rapidly reversed. This fragile investment incentives does not lead to a sustained expansion of
the tradable whose productivity remains unchanged. In this case, the government could be
tempted to use exchange rate policy to keep devaluing the domestic currency -as, for instance,
in a passive crawling-peg regime- in an attempt to preserve the undervaluation incentive. This
strategy, however, is likely to fail. A policy of continuous nominal depreciations would likely
accelerate the rate of non-tradable price and wage inflation. The relative price adjustment
would occur in a context of accelerating inflation as described, for instance, in Calvo et al.
(1995). An inflationary environment, where relative price volatility and uncertainty are higher,
would make investment in the tradable sector even less likely.
A different result may arise if, together with the exchange rate devaluation, the government
implements domestic demand management policies to slow down the tendency towards non-
tradable price increases and wage management policies to coordinate wages increases with
productivity growth in the tradable sector. This case is illustrated by the solid black lines.
After the devaluation, the rise in unit costs is steady but moderate. This evolution maintains
the profitability incentives during the initial period and thus induces investment in tradable
activities. As accumulation occurs, this sector becomes gradually more productive and there-
fore increases in unit costs do not undermine tradable profitability. As a result, the expansion
of tradable sector not only comes jointly with higher economic growth but also with increasing
real wages.
3 The model
In this section, I develop a dual open economy model inspired by Ros and Skott (1998) to
formally address the stylized behaviors described in section 2. This setting takes the view that
the tradable (T ) sector is the locus of modern technology and assumes that its production
operates with increasing returns to scale due to learning by doing. The tradable sector is the
only one that utilizes capital, K, whose stock is given in the short run. The tradable good can
be used for consumption or investment. The non-tradable (N) sector uses labor and a fixed
factor. The assumption that non-tradable production does not require capital is a shortcut
to represent the tradable sector as the locus of increasing returns and technological progress.
The economy is characterized as developing not only because sectors operate with significantly
different technologies but also because of the existence of substantial open unemployment (U).
There is a single labor market with a homogeneous nominal wage rate, W , which is also given
in the short run due to nominal stickiness.
3.1 Basic relationships and the behavior in the short run
The economy is small and open to trade and finance. Since the exchange rate, E, is credibly
fixed, the interest parity condition imposes that
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i = i∗ (1)
where i is the domestic cost of finance and i∗ the international interest rate. Given this
simplification, monetary policy is passive as suggested by the trilemma when the exchange
rate is fixed and capital perfectly mobile. The assumption also implies that the capital account
of the balance of payments always adjusts to accommodate the result of the current account.
Therefore, balance of payments imbalances are assumed away from the analysis.
The price of tradable goods, PT , is determined by the law of one price:
PT = EP
∗
T (2)
where P ∗T is the international price of the tradable good. Thus, through exchange rate policy
the government controls the absolute price of tradables.
The tradable sector operates with a Cobb-Douglas production function with sectoral increas-
ing returns to scale due to to learning by doing externalities. For the representative firm this
is
YT = ˜AKγK
αL1−αT (3)
where YT and LT represent output and employment in the tradable sector and K˜
γ the ex-
ternal effect. The average sectoral capital stock K˜ is exogenous to the individual firm and in
equilibrium is equal to the capital stock of the representative firm, i.e., K = K˜. The learning
by doing externality is assumed to be small so that α+γ < 1. This is a plausible assumption,
which will be key in the dynamic analysis of subsection 3.2.
Given the capital stock and the wage rate, firms in the tradable sector demand labor at any
point in time so to maximize profits in a perfect competition environment. Hence
LT = [A(1− α)] 1αω−
1
α
T K
(γ+α)
α (4)
where ωT ≡ WPT is the tradable product wage.
Profits in the tradable sector, ΠT , are:
ΠT ≡ rPTK = αPTYT = α
1− αWLT (5)
The non-tradable sector produces using labor and a fixed factor. The production function for
the representative firm in this sector is
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YN = DL
β
N (6)
where D is a constant, YN and LN represent non-tradable output and employment and with
0 < β < 1.
The demand for labor in this sector also arises from profit maximization by the owners of the
fixed factor in an atomistic and price-taking context. Thus,
LN = (
1
Dβ
)
1
β−1 (
PN
W
)
1
1−β = (
1
Dβ
)
1
β−1X
1
1−β (7)
where PN is the price of the non-tradable good and X expresses this price relatively to the
nominal wage rate; i.e., X ≡ PNW . From equations 6 and 7 it is clear that the higher the value
of β the more elastic non-tradable supply is.
Given that monetary policy is passive, domestic demand management policies are conducted
through fiscal policy. In practice, governments mostly spend on non-tradables and the impulse
of fiscal policy on domestic demand is seen through changes in the fiscal balance. Thus,
increases (contractions) in the fiscal surplus tend to operate as contractionary (expansionary)
impulses on the demand for non-tradables. To model this mechanism simply, I assume that
the government spends only on non-tradable goods and that the amount of spending is θ
times its tax collection. Tax revenues, in turn, come from an ad-valorem tax on non-tradable
private consumption, tN . Hence,
PNGN = θtNPNCN (8)
with θ > 0, 0 < tN < 1 and GN representing public spending . Public sector primary surplus
is thus defined as
Sg = tN (1− θ)PNCN = sgPNCN (9)
where sg = tN (1−θ) is the primary surplus rate. It is immediate that sg defines the situation
of government sector primary balance. When sg = 0, primary fiscal accounts are balanced,
when sg > 0 the government faces a primary surplus and when sg < 0 a primary deficit.
13 For
simplicity, I focus on the primary surplus and do not explore the intertemporal behavior of
public debt. This omission is unlikely to hide an unsustainable behavior in the management
of macroeconomic policy: the recommended fiscal policy will be contractionary in order to
moderate RER appreciation forces coming from non-tradable price inflation, and thus macroe-
conomic policy coordination will go in the direction of reducing public debt. In any case, to
13This, in turn, is achieved by setting θ = 1, θ < 1 and θ > 1, respectively
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minimize the concerns about the evolution of public debt, I will assume initially that sg = 0.
In section 4, it will be shown that policy coordination requires a transitory increase in fiscal
surplus; i.e., sg > 0. Thus, along most of the analysis, fiscal policy will have a neutral effect
on public sector net asset position. Only when macroeconomic policy coordination is required
to maintain the undervaluation incentive, it will transitorily increase public sector net asset
position.
Private consumption derives from consumers’ utility maximization of a Cobb-Douglas func-
tion. Hence,
CT
CN
=
µ(1 + tN )
1− µ
PN
PT
(10)
where µ and 1 − µ are the shares of consumers income spent on tradable and non-tradable
goods, respectively.
I follow a standard practice and assume that workers do not save, while capitalists in the
tradable sector and owners of the fixed factor in the non-tradable sector save a fraction s of
their profits and rents. Evidence systematically shows that the saving rate out of wages is
substantially smaller than that resulting from corporate profits. If workers were allowed to
save in the model, they would be owners of part of the capital stock in the tradable sector -
probably indirectly through financial claims- making them receivers of part of tradable profits.
Even under the simplest assumption that all classes have the same propensity to save, allowing
workers to save would complicate the algebra. Since the incidence of income distribution on
consumption is not at the center of the argument addressed in this paper, I opt for the
simplified specification.14 Hence,
PTCT + (1 + tN )PNCN = W (LT + LN ) + (1− s)(ΠN + ΠT ) (11)
Since non-tradables are used only for domestic consumption, the market equilibrium condition
requires that output equals expenditure
YN = CN +GN = (1 + θtN )CN (12)
14The domestic interest rate, i, could influence the behavior of private savings. However, since it is given
by the international interest rate, s appears in the model as a parameter. As discussed in section 2, the
government could use sterilized interventions and capital management techniques to regain some control over
monetary policy. In that case, it could manage i within a certain range and thus influence the evolution of the
price of non-tradables through s. In other words, demand management policies would also include monetary
policy. Although governments targeting a competitive RER actually use a combination of policies to have some
autonomy in conducting monetary policy, I will ignore this possibility to keep the algebra simple. However, s
could be thought as a variable potentially influenced by monetary policy and other saving incentives offered
by the government.
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Finally, there is a fixed labor force L, which is either unemployed or employed in one of the
two sectors. Thus
L = LT + LN + U (13)
Equations 1 to 13 define the behavior of the economy in the short run; i.e., for given values of
K and W . The subsystem defined by equations 6 to 12 determines the short-run equilibrium
conditions for the non-tradable goods markets. The equilibrium value of the non-tradable
price relative to the nominal wage rate, X ≡ PNW , results
X = [δ
(1− sg)(1− µ)
s(1− β) + [1− s(1− β)][µ+ sg(1− µ)]ω
− 1
α
T K
γ+α
α ]1−β (14)
with δ = [1+(1−s)α/(1−α)][A(1−α)]
1
α (Dβ)
β
β−1
D , and partial derivatives XK > 0, XωT < 0, and
Xsg < 0. A rise in K increases the demand for non-tradable goods raising employment, output
and prices in the non-tradable sector (i.e., ↑ X). An increase in ωT reduces profitability in
this sector contracting tradable output and thus reducing private consumption. The result is
a reduction in the demand for non-tradables and in its price (i.e., ↓ X). Domestic demand
management policies through sg can affect the behavior of the price of non-tradables. A rise
of sg reduces the aggregate expenditure on non-tradables and thus lowers the price of non-
tradable goods (i.e., ↓ X). This is easy to see: the government spends less in non-tradables
than the amount of resources that absorbs in form of taxes, which otherwise would go to
private consumption of non-tradables.15 Finally, an increase in E is equivalent to a reduction
in ωT (given that ωT ≡ WEP ∗T ). Thus, by lowering the product wage in the tradable sector as
characterized in the stylized behaviors of figure 1, an exchange rate policy targeting a more
competitive RER (i.e., a higher E) leads in the short run to an increase in employment and
output in both sectors and a rise in the price of non-tradable goods (i.e., ↑ X). To assess
whether it also triggers a sustained expansion of the tradable sector and whether other policies
are needed to complement it, we have to characterize the dynamic behavior of the system and
analyze the “race” between productivity and the product wage in the tradable sector.
3.2 Dynamic behavior
By assumption, the system has K and W predetermined at any given point in time. The
rate of capital accumulation Kˆ is assumed to be a positive function of tradable profitability
r relative to the cost of finance, i. Hence
15The price of non-tradables also falls when private saving rate, s, rises; i.e., Xs < 0. Thus, in cases in
which governments have some autonomy to conduct monetary policy, a rise in the domestic interest rate would
increase s and thus reduce the price of non-tradables (i.e., ↓ X).
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Kˆ = f(r − i) (15)
with the partial derivative f ′ > 0 and f(0) = 0.
From equations 2 to 5, the profit rate in the tradable sector is
r = A
1
αα(1− α) 1−αα ω
α−1
α
T K
γ
α (16)
The profit rate in the tradable sector is thus a positive function of K and negative of ωT .
Capital accumulation has a self-sustained effect resulting from the expansion of the tradable
sector that operates under increasing returns. In other words, since increases in K lead to
increases in r due to the learning externalities, K has a positive feedback effect on Kˆ. The
sustainability of the capital accumulation/economic growth process would then depend on a
“race” between the productivity gains in this sector and the evolution of the product wage
ωT . Given that PT is fixed, the latter would depend on the dynamic evolution of W .
Variations in W are assumed to be determined in the bargaining process between workers
and firms. On the one hand, wages adjust according to the gap between the actual real wage
rate, WP , and the real wage rate that workers demand given their bargaining power and the
set of institutional, political and moral/cultural factors that influence wage determination. I
call the latter the “bargained” real wage rate, ω. The other component influencing nominal
wage determination is expected price inflation PˆE . Hence
Wˆ = λ(z)[
ω(l, z)
W/P
− 1] + PˆE (17)
Workers bargaining power is captured in equation 17 through the employment rate, l ≡
LT + LN , where the labor force has been normalized to unity (i.e., L = 1). It seems reason-
able to think that as the economy grows and the employment rate increases, workers gain
bargaining power and demand -and firms are more willing to give- nominal wages that imply
higher real wages; i.e., a partial derivative ωl > 0. On the theoretical side, this assumption is
in line with efficiency wage models and the literature of wage bargaining.16 The assumption is
also supported by empirical evidence. In their influential work on the “wage curve”, Blanch-
flower and Oswald (1994 and 2005) have established the existence of a negative relationship
between wage levels and regional/sectoral unemployment. They interpret this stylized fact as
indicating that workers in labor markets with lower unemployment rates have greater bargain-
ing power and consequently obtain higher real wages. Based on these theoretical and empirical
grounds, it seems safe to posit that in a development process in which the employment rate
is increasing real wages also increase.
16See Akerlof and Yellen (1986) and Farber (1986) for relevant surveys.
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The discussion in section 2 suggests, however, that wage determination is also influenced
by institutional, political, cultural/moral elements, which are context-dependent and can be
influenced by government intervention. z is the variable condensing these factors, which is
subject to government influence via wage management policies. A rise in z indicates the case
when the government uses its wage management policies to induce an increase in the real wage
for a given rate of employment. This could be, for instance, the decision to raise the real value
of the minimum wage rate or a generous public sector wage settlement. Wage management
policies conducted through z can affect not only the steady state value of the real wage, but
also the speed at which wages change over time. Governments, for instance, can regulate
the duration of labor contracts between unions and firms or implement temporary incomes
policies (e.g., wage freezes) and thus influence the lifetime of wage rigidity. This effect is
captured in the the speed of wage adjustment λ(z). Thus, the government can use the wage
management policy instrument z to increase or decrease the length of the period during which
a wage contract lasts, according to the partial derivative λz > 0.
To facilitate the mathematical exposition, I give the “bargained” real wage rate a specific and
plausible form
ω = ω¯(z)(1− l)−τ (18)
where ω¯(z) represents a real wage rate that prevails in conditions of very low employment levels
(or a minimum real wage rate), with a partial derivative ω¯z > 0. Labor market conditions,
in turn, affect the determination of the real wage bargained by workers via the employment
rate l and the parameter τ > 0. One important characteristic of the specific form in 18 is
that the elasticity of the bargained real wage with respect to the employment rate is variable.
The impact of changes in the employment rate on the real wage is lower (higher) for lower
(higher) levels of employment. This seems a plausible description of the influence of labor
market conditions on the determination of wages.
Expectation formation can be critical for macroeconomic outcome, but given our focus on
medium-run behavior, it is reasonable to assume that workers manage to adjust nominal
wages to the actual evolution of the price level, P . The adjustment process may not work
smoothly in the short run but it is likely to do it in longer spans of time. Therefore, I follow
a standard practice and assume that workers form expectations rationally.17 Hence
PˆE = Pˆ = µPˆT + (1− µ)PˆN (19)
where µ and 1 − µ are the weights of tradable and non-tradable prices in the private con-
sumption basket.
Since PT is given by exchange rate policy at any point in time, expected inflation is equivalent
to non-tradable price inflation
17Assuming adaptive expectations would not change the results.
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PˆE = (1− µ)PˆN (20)
By definition PN ≡ XW . Thus, using equation 14 we get:
PˆN = −(1− β)
α
ωˆT +
(γ + α)(1− β)
α
Kˆ + Wˆ (21)
Since PT is given at any point in time Wˆ = ωˆT . Thus, using equations 17 to 21, we get an
expression for the dynamic behavior of ωT
ωˆT = η{λ(z)[ω−µT X1−µω¯(z)(1− l)−τ − 1] +
(1− µ)(γ + α)(1− β)
α
Kˆ} (22)
with η = α[αµ+(1−µ)(1−β)] > 0.
Expressions 15 and 16 describe the evolution of the capital stock over time: it increases with
K and shrinks with ωT . The dynamic behavior of ωT is more involved to derive. Appendix
A gives a formal derivation, but intuitively it can be seen that ωˆT increases with K and
declines with ωT . When K increases, the employment rate expands and the price of the non-
tradable good goes up. Conversely, increases in ωT -by reducing tradable profitability- lead
to a contraction in the employment rate and in the price of the non-tradable good. In the
former case, the rise in the employment rate increases workers bargaining power and the rise
of the price of non-tradable reduces the actual real wage rate. Thus, both effects associated
with the increase in K generate pressures for rises in ωT . In the latter case, the effects go in
the opposite direction: a fall in K leads to a fall in ωT .
Formally, we get a dynamic system for K and ωT defined by the following reduced form:
Kˆ = F (K,ωT ) (23)
ωˆT = G(K,ωT ; sg, z) (24)
with partial derivatives FK > 0, FωT < 0, GK > 0, GωT < 0 (see appendix A for details).
The nullclines of equations 23 and 24 are positively sloped. The Kˆ = 0 locus is defined by
the combinations of K and ωT for which the capital stock is stationary. Given the increasing
returns in the tradable sector, a rise in K augments tradable profitability inducing more
investment and capital accumulation as described by equation 16. Only a rise in ωT restores
the profit rate to a level that keeps K constant. The ωˆT = 0 locus describes the “equilibrium”
in the labor market in the sense that the resulting value of ωT is stationary. An increase in K
raises the employment rate and the price of non-tradables. The first effect enhances workers
bargaining power and the second reduces actual real wages. Both lead to demands for higher
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wages. A rise in the nominal wage rate consistent with the stationary tradable product wage
rate ωT restrains workers from demanding further increases. The required reaction of wages
to keep the labor market in “equilibrium”, however, is not uniform along the ωˆT = 0 locus,
but becomes more pronounced with higher levels of K. This feature results from the fact that
the behavior of the bargained real wage -specified in equation 18- is more sensitive to changes
in the employment rate as the latter increases. A given variation in the employment rate
would derive in higher changes in wages the higher the employment rate is. This particular
aspect of the ωˆT = 0 locus -i.e., a variable elasticity of ωT with respect to K along the locus-
is key for the possibility of multiple equilibria in the model.
Appendix B shows the conditions under which multiple equilibria arise. A critical condition
for the possibility of multiple equilibria is that the positive externality in the production of
tradable goods, γ, has to be moderate; more precisely: γ + α < 1. If this condition is not
fulfilled, the productivity gains arising from learning by doing would be so large that the
resulting profitability incentives for capital accumulation would be unbounded. Assuming
that the not very restrictive conditions specified in appendix B are met, the only interesting
case involves two intersections between the ωˆT = 0 and Kˆ = 0 loci; one at low levels of K
and another at high levels of K.18 The low-K intersection would be a saddle point and the
high-K intersection a spiral or a node. Depending on the speeds of adjustment of K and ωT ,
the system would show different dynamic behaviors. A key aspect dominating the dynamic
behavior of the system is that the effect of K on Kˆ is positive (i.e., FK > 0) and the effect of
ωT on ωˆT is negative (i.e., GωT < 0). This implies that capital accumulation is a destabilizing
force in the system while the product wage represents a stabilizing one. Because of this, the
speeds of adjustment of K and ωT would play a critical role defining the stability or lack of
it at the high-K equilibrium. The higher the speed of adjustment of K (ωT ), the more likely
that the high-K equilibrium becomes unstable (stable). Since I am interested in the case in
which the high-K equilibrium is locally stable, I will assume that the speed of adjustment
of K is low enough and the speed of adjustment of ωT high enough to guarantee such an
outcome.
Figure 2 describes the benchmark phase diagram. Point C represents the high-K locally stable
equilibrium (i.e., the“development” equilibrium) and B the low-K saddle point. A is another
locally stable equilibrium that represents the extreme case of complete underdevelopment.
The saddle path divides the phase diagrams in two regions. The region on the left is the
basin of attraction of A, whereas that on the right the basin of attraction of C. Thus, if
the economy is initially located to the left of the saddle path, the dynamic behavior would
gradually take it towards the complete underdevelopment equilibrium A. If it begins to the
right of the saddle path, the dynamic behavior would take it to the development equilibrium
C. Only in the case that the economy is initially situated on the saddle path, it would end
up at the saddle point B. Importantly, the location of the saddle path would depend on the
speeds of adjustment. This issue is further discussed in section 4.
18Two other alternatives are possible. In one case the nullclines do not intersect and in the other they are
tangential to each other at a single point. None of these cases are of economic interest.
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Figure 2: Benchmark phase diagram
3.3 The role of exchange rate policy
A rise in the nominal exchange rate E -i.e., a devaluation- reduces the product wage in the
tradable sector ωT and leads in the short run to an expansion of output and employment
in both sectors. In the medium run, the increase in tradable profitability would induce
higher investment in the tradable sector. This would imply an increase in K, which in turn
would have a positive feedback effect on Kˆ due to the learning externalities in the production
of tradables. On the other hand, the process of capital accumulation would also lead to
the absorption of unemployed workers by both sectors and an increase in total income and
aggregate demand. As a result, both the employment rate and the price of non-tradables
would increase leading to demands for higher wages. The subsequent rise in ωT would have
a negative impact on Kˆ. Thus, the possibility of a virtuous dynamic of development and
structural change would depend on the “race” between productivity gains in the tradable
sector and the increments in the labor costs.
A devaluation may trigger a process of capital accumulation that leads to a sufficiently rapid
productivity growth that offsets the gradual increments in labor costs. In such a case, exchange
rate policy could be sufficient to generate a self-sustained dynamics of capital accumulation
and structural change. This case is illustrated in figure 3. The nominal devaluation moves
the economy trapped in underdevelopment region represented by point A to B1, which is to
the right of the saddle path. At this point the positive feedback effects of K on Kˆ more than
compensate the increases in ωT associated with higher employment rate and non-tradable
prices. The economy would gradually move towards the equilibrium point C, where the
economy would eventually reach higher capital per capita ratio and real wages.
A relevant question is whether a devaluation would always be enough to sustain the price
incentive for capital accumulation as in point B1. If not, the question is whether the coor-
dination of exchange rate policy with domestic demand management and wage management
policies may contribute to such a goal. Next section analyzes this issue.
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Figure 3: A “successful” devaluation
4 The case for policy coordination
Figure 3 illustrates the case in which a devaluation generates by itself the profitability required
to trigger a sustained process of capital accumulation in the tradable sector. Graphically, the
economy moves from A to B1. It is important to notice that at B1 tradable productivity is
low because of the low level of K. Thus, the high profitability in the tradable sector at B1
derives mostly from the very low value of ωT achieved by the devaluation. One cannot always
expect that exchange rate policy would be able to provide such a high level of profitability
to tradable firms. A relative price incentive generated by a large devaluation may be rapidly
reversed due to a high pass-through on non-tradable prices or to real wage resistance by
workers. Such outcomes are actually in line with the evidence from time series econometrics,
which has documented that the responses of the RER to changes in the nominal exchange rate
are not linear: the speed of reversion is higher for larger depreciations (Taylor et al., 2001).
A quick erosion of tradable profitability would undermine the incentives to investment and
capital accumulation in the tradable sector would not result. The likelihood of an outcome
like this one increases with the size of the required depreciation to move the economy from
one state to another. In terms of the model, the larger the distance between A and B1, the
less likely that a devaluation can trigger a virtuous dynamics by itself. One could consider to
offset the erosion of tradable profitability caused by higher prices with further devaluations.
As discussed above, such a policy response may do more harm than good. In a context
in which nominal devaluations instead of generating a RER depreciation lead to rises in
domestic prices, engaging in further devaluations is likely to accelerate the rate of inflation.
Experience in developing countries has shown that devaluation-inflation spirals are not rare
events. It would be harder to argue that the incentives of a competitive RER on investment
would be unaffected by a context of high and accelerating inflation. The discussion suggests
that exchange rate policy may face a limit in its ability to achieve RER levels that are
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Figure 4: An “unsuccessful” devaluation
both competitive and stable to induce investment in the tradable sector, while preserving
macroeconomic stability. In terms of the model, it implies that reaching a situation like B1
may be not feasible.
Figure 4 shows the case of a devaluation in which the maximum “feasible” RER (i.e., the
lowest “feasible” ωT ) is located on the left of the saddle path. The economy moves from A
to B2, the latter representing a point with the same K but a higher ωT than the point B1 in
figure 3. After the devaluation, the economy is still trapped in the underdevelopment zone.
The RER undervaluation incentive would initially induce tradable firms to invest. However,
capital accumulation would be short-lived and would not generate productivity gains high
enough to compensate for the increase in ωT . The economy would rapidly cross the Kˆ = 0
locus and incentives to invest would disappear. This dynamic behavior corresponds to that
illustrated with gray lines in figure 1. In that case, the undervaluation incentive vanished
so quickly that capital accumulation in the tradable sector was virtually nil and led to no
significant improvement in productivity.
In a case like the one discussed above, the undervaluation incentive does not last long enough
to induce tradable firms to invest and thus to experience structural change. When capital
initially accumulates, unemployed workers are absorbed by the two sectors and aggregate
output, income and demand expands. The resulting rise in the employment rate and the price
of non-tradables derive in demands for higher wages, which reduces tradable profitability and
the incentives to invest. Since tradable cost rise faster than productivity, incentives to invest
end up disappearing. As discussed in section 2, the government has instruments to moderate
these tendencies. To restrain inflationary pressures in non-tradables prices -and thus preserve
the real wage in terms of non-tradables and avoid demands for wage increases- the government
may attempt to moderate the pace of non-tradable demand. An increase in the fiscal surplus
(i.e., ↑ sg) would accomplish that goal. The government may also want to coordinate the
pace of real wage increases with the rate of productivity growth in the tradable sector. This
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may be especially important at the beginning of the development process in which tradable
profitability depends heavily on price competitiveness. The positive external effects due to
learning arise as the process of accumulation gains momentum. Wage management policies
-captured in the policy variable z- may be used for such a purpose.
In the model, the values of the demand management policy parameter sg and the wage
management policy parameter z determine the location of the ωˆT = 0 locus. An increase in
sg reduces the equilibrium value of the non-tradable price and raises the actual real wage rate,
W/P . At any level of K, this implies that actual real wages are higher than the bargained
real wage. Equilibrium in the labor market requires a contraction of W , which lowers ωt down
to a new stationary level. This is represented with a downward shift of the ωˆT = 0 locus.
Similarly, a contraction of z reduces the bargained real wage at any level of K. Equilibrium
in the labor market requires a reduction of W , which shifts the ωˆT = 0 locus down.
Figure 5 illustrates the case when the coordination of exchange rate policy with domestic
demand and wage management policies is successful at triggering capital accumulation and
structural change. The figure zooms in the low-K intersection leaving the high-K equilibrium
out of sight. The thin ωˆT = 0 locus and saddle path correspond to the case of no policy
coordination. As in the case of figure 4, an exchange rate depreciation would move the
economy from A to the same point B2. As before, at B2, the economy would be on the
region on the left of the saddle path, trapped in the underdevelopment zone. The dynamic
behavior would be the same as in figure 4. However, if the same depreciation is coordinated
with complementary policies that aim to preserve the RER undervaluation incentive longer,
B2 would be on the right of the saddle path. This happens because the use of complementary
policies (i.e., a rise in sg, a reduction in z or a combination of both) is now represented by the
thick ωˆT = 0 locus and saddle path. In this new context, the the economy would experience
a sustained process of capital accumulation that would eventually take it to the development
equilibrium represented by C, which is not shown in the figure.
Figure 5: The policy coordination case
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It is worth noting that the implementation of the complementary policies need not be perma-
nent. Their implementation is critical at the beginning of the accumulation process, but they
could be softened gradually. As the tradable sector becomes more mature (i.e., with higher
capital-labor ratios and higher productivity), it can resists higher increases in real wages.
Thus, if the government decides to gradually increase their spending (↓ sg) or implement
measures to induce higher wages (↑ z), the accumulated gains in tradable productivity would
tolerate the rises in costs without severely compromising profitability. In terms of figure 5,
the government can reverse the policies and return the ωˆT = 0 locus and saddle path to
their original location provided the economy remains to the right of the saddle path. Thus,
as mentioned in section 3, during the period of policy coordination, the government would
experience a transitory primary surplus and then return to a permanent situation of balanced
primary budget.
The critical role of policy coordination can be illustrated in the model in another way. Recall
that wage management policies may not only affect the equilibrium level of wages, but also
the speed at which the actual wage rate converges to its equilibrium value. This was captured
by making the policy variable z affect the speed of wage adjustment λ. Figure 6 illustrates the
effect of a reduction on the speed of wage adjustment by lowering z. For expositive purposes,
the graph assumes that movements in z have no effect on the ωˆT = 0 locus (i.e., z is not an
argument of the function characterizing the behavior of the bargained real wage rate, ω). A
change in the speed of adjustment does not have an effect on the location of the the nullclines
but changes the position of the saddle path. Particularly for our interest, a lower speed of
wage adjustment shifts the saddle path closer to the Kˆ = 0 locus, which is represented in
figure 6 as a move from the thin to the thick saddle path.
Figure 6:
The intuition is straightforward: a lower speed of wage adjustment makes the horizontal
movements (i.e., K adjustments) relatively stronger, thus making the stability regions more
fragile (i.e., the saddle path is easier to cross). Important for the argument, the fact that
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the government can make the periods in which wages are sticky longer gives tradable firm
more time to take advantage of the RER undervaluation incentive. Investment in the tradable
sector after a devaluation is more likely to accelerate when the incentives are perceived to
last longer. This element aims to be captured by the location of B2 on the right of the
thick saddle path as opposed to being on the left of the thin saddle path. In the latter case,
the economy would remain trapped in the underdevelopment zone (gradually moving to the
complete underdevelopment equilibrium), whereas in the former the economy would expand
towards C. It is an empirical question the extent to which this kind of policy can help the
purpose of maintaining a competitive RER. In any event, the case points to the existence of
an additional instrument that could play at least some role in helping manage a competitive
RER strategy.
5 Conclusions
Economic development is a complex process that blends several social, political and economic
elements. According to recent research, the level of the RER might be one of these important
factors. In particular, a competitive RER seems to provide an environment conducive to
economic development and structural change. The positive effect of competitive RERs appears
to be mediated by the expansion of tradable production. On the one hand, this relaxes the
foreign exchange constraint allowing for a greater capacity to import capital goods that are
required by domestic firms to expand their production capacity. On the other hand, the
expansion of tradable production benefits the economy as a whole because of the technological
and learning externalities that are prevalent in this sector. Because of economic development
appears to be tradable-led, there is room for government intervention to provide incentives to
induce capital accumulation in these activities.
Incentives for investment typically take the form of higher profitability. There is not one but
many ways to foster tradable profitability. Several instruments can be used for such a purpose
under the label of trade and industrial policies, including subsidized credits, tax exceptions,
direct subsidies, tariff, taxes and quotas on competing goods. Using exchange rate policy
is another viable alternative. One limitation is that while this policy controls the absolute
price of tradables tightly it faces more difficulties when it comes to affect its relative price
against non-tradables and labor. It is a controversial issue the extent to which governments
can permanently influence relative prices in an economy. But even accepting that in the long
run relative prices are determined by economic fundamentals, it seems widely recognized that
a policy affecting relative prices for a relevant transitory period can have a substantial effect
on long-term economic performance.
The contribution of this paper is simple. It indicates that exchange rate policy can better
accomplish the task of managing relative prices to foster tradable profitability when is coor-
dinated with other policies. Because non-tradable prices and wages might tend to increase
relatively to the price of tradables along the development process, policy coordination may
help retard these tendencies, preserving tradable profitability and thus giving this sector time
to augment its productivity. In particular, it seems appropriate to conduct exchange rate
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policy simultaneously with domestic demand management policies that contain non-tradable
price inflation and wage management policies that coordinate the pace of wage increases with
growth in tradable productivity. Policy coordination might be especially important in the
early stages of development, during which the expansion of tradable firms is more sensitive
to price incentives.
Macroeconomic policy coordination under a competitive RER strategy represents an alter-
native to the in-vogue floating cum inflation targeting (FIT) policy framework. Under this
framework, central banks follow a mandate that focuses exclusively on inflation and ignores
other policy objectives as employment or the RER. To achieve the inflation target, domestic
demand management is carried through monetary policy using a reference interest rate as the
main instrument. The suitability of this strategy for developing countries has recently been
object of controversy. Since in developing countries credit markets are shallow and therefore
the sensitivity of aggregate demand to interest movements low, central banks may need to
raise interest rates excessively to achieve the inflation target. Inflation is typically reduced
but mostly as a result of the appreciation of the exchange rate generated by inflows of capital
attracted by the higher interest rate. For this reason, many have argued that this policy
framework has a RER appreciation-bias and thus is not development-friendly.19
Macroeconomic policy under a competitive RER strategy is more complex precisely because it
requires the coordination of several policies. As discussed in section 2, having some room for
monetary policy may require the implementation of sterilized foreign interventions and capital
account management techniques. Although there are examples of successful implementations,
these policies may face difficulties. Sterilization may run in significant quasi-fiscal costs and
capital inflows may find ways to circumvent regulations. In any case, financial integration
implies that monetary policy is not completely autonomous when exchange rate policy is trying
to target a competitive RER. For this reason, the role of fiscal policy in managing aggregate
demand is substantially more preponderant than in a FIT framework. In particular, fiscal
policy has a contractive-bias under a competitive RER regime, because it has to prevent
real appreciation coming from non-tradable price inflation. This aspect has already been
highlighted by other authors.20
The role of wage management policies in a competitive RER strategy might appear more
controversial. The policy prescription that derives from my analysis may result somewhat
unappealing, especially to policymakers. It suggest that they should attempt to persuade
workers and their leaders that it is in their own benefit to accept real wage increases that
do not hurt tradable sector profitability severely. However, if economic development depends
on the expansion of the tradable sector as the research surveyed in this paper seems to
suggest and if tradable expansion depends to a great extent on its profitability, it seems
hard not to conclude that the pace of real wage increases cannot substantially outpace the
rate of tradable productivity growth, especially during the early stages of development. The
conclusion might have a sour taste in the sense that wage aspirations appear as a threat to
the health of the chicken of the golden eggs. However, as the model in the previous sections
19See, for instance, the contributions in the volume edited by Epstein and Yeldan (2009).
20See, for instance, Eichengreen (2007) and Frenkel (2008).
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illustrates, moderation in wage demands during the transition period has a reward: in the
development equilibrium real wages and employment are higher. This outcome is welfare-
enhancing. This result should not be surprising. In a developed economy, tradable activities
can afford substantially higher wages because they are substantially more productive.
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Appendix
A Derivation of the ωˆT = 0 locus
From 22, there would be no tendency towards changes in wages and therefore ωˆT = 0 (i.e.,
the labor market would be in “equilibrium”) when:
λ(z)[
ω
W/P
− 1] + (1− µ)(γ + α)(1− β)
α
Kˆ = 0 (25)
We know that ∂ωT∂K |Kˆ=0 > 0, thus to derive the shape of ωˆT = 0, we need first to obtain that
of the ω = WP locus. This requires that
ω
W/P
= ω−µT X
1−µω = 1 (26)
Equation 14 establishes that X depends positively on K and negatively on ωT . Equation
18 states that the “bargained” real wage rate is a positive function of the employment rate
l ≡ LT + LN . Equation 4 indicates that LT increases with K and diminishes with ωT .
Similarly, equations 7 and 14 imply that LN increases with K and shrinks with ωT . As
a result, the “bargained” real wage varies positively with K and negatively with ωT ; i.e.,
ωK ≡ ∂ω/∂K > 0 and ωωT ≡ ∂ω/∂ωT < 0. Equation 26 can thus be expressed as an implicit
function on K, ωT and the policy variables sg and i
J(ωT ,K, sg, z) = ω
−µ
T X
1−µω − 1 = 0 (27)
Given that XK > 0, XωT < 0, ωK > 0 and ωωT < 0, then the ω =
W
P locus is positively
sloped in the ωT -K space
∂ωT
∂K |ω=
W
P
= − (1− µ)X
−µωXK +X1−µωK
[−µω−1T X1−µ + (1− µ)X−µXωT ]ω +X1−µωωT
> 0 (28)
Therefore, the ωˆT = 0 locus is also positively sloped in the ωT -K space. In the important
case of multiple equilibria -whose conditions are derived in appendix B- it is straightforward
to see that the ωˆT = 0 locus lies in between of the ω =
W
P and Kˆ = 0 loci as described in
figure 7.
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Figure 7: Benchmark phase diagram
B Existence of multiple equilibria
The existence of multiple equilibria occurs when the ω = WP and Kˆ = 0 loci intersect more
than once. The Kˆ = 0 locus is obtained by setting r defined by equation 16 equal to i. Taking
natural logs and differentiating totally yields
d lnωT
d lnK |Kˆ=0
=
γ
1− α (29)
Equation 29 indicates that the Kˆ = 0 locus is a positively sloped straight line in the lnωT -lnK
space.
A necessary condition for the multiple intersections of the two loci is that the ω = WP locus
in the lnωT -lnK space has a lower slope than the Kˆ = 0 locus for some values of K and a
higher one for some other set of values of K.
To obtain the slope of the ω = WP locus in the lnωT -lnK space, we need to substitute equations
14 and 18 into expression 26, take natural log to the resulting expression and differentiate it
totally. With a little of algebra manipulation this yields
d lnωT
d lnK |ω=
W
P
= (γ + α)
(1− µ)(1− β) + τ l1−l
µα+ (1− µ)(1− β) + τ l1−l
> 0 (30)
As with expression 28, the one above is also positive. Its value, however, is not constant but
critically depends on the evolution of l/(1− l) as K varies. Using equations 4, 7 and 14, it is
clear that l/(1− l)→∞ as K →∞ and l/(1− l)→ 0 as K → 0.
When K →∞,
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d lnωT
d lnK |ω=
W
P
→ (γ + α) (31)
The slope of the ω = WP locus is greater than that of the Kˆ = 0 locus if only if
γ + α < 1 (32)
When K → 0
d lnωT
d lnK |ω=
W
P
→ (γ + α) (1− µ)(1− β)
µα+ (1− µ)(1− β) (33)
Given condition 32, the slope of the ω = WP locus is lower than that of the Kˆ = 0 locus if
γ
(1− α) >
(1− µ)(1− β)
µ+ (1− µ)(1− β) (34)
The existence of multiple equilibria requires condition 32 to hold. This implies that the
positive external effects in the production tradables need to be moderate, otherwise the pro-
ductivity gains arising from learning by doing would be so large that the resulting profitability
incentives for capital accumulation would be unbounded. The left-hand side of condition 34
is the slope of the Kˆ = 0 locus (i.e., equation 29). This condition thus implies that for the
two loci to intersect at low levels of K, the required reaction of ωT to changes in K to reach
a stationary level of K has to be higher than the rises of ωT associated to the increases in the
price of non-tradables when K expands. Condition 34 is more likely to hold the higher the
values of α, β and µ; i.e. the more capital intensive the tradable production, the more elastic
the supply of non-tradables and the higher the share of tradables in private consumption.
Conditions 32 and 34 are empirically plausible and can both hold simultaneously. Assuming
such a case implies that, similarly to Ros and Skott (1998), the two loci intersect twice, none
or once when they are tangent one to another.
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